We study the impact of public and private information on prices and volatility in financial markets. Previous studies demonstrate that public information, such as macroeconomic news releases, significantly affects both prices and volatility, while information that is distributed asymmetrically across participants, and thus privately held, affects prices. However, research on the impact of private information on volatility is scarce. We investigate this link using a high-frequency data set of the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond futures. Furthermore, we contribute to the analysis of information effects on returns and propose a model that simultaneously estimates the effects of public and private information on both prices and volatility. We find that private information variables such as order flow and bid-ask spread are statistically and economically significant explanatory variables for volatility. Our results imply that private information should not be ignored in volatility modeling for, e.g., risk management purposes.
Introduction
One of the most fundamental questions in financial economics is what drives asset prices and volatility. Both quantities are believed to change due to the arrival of new information.
In this context it is useful to distinguish between public and private information. Public information concerns news that becomes available to all market participants at the same point in time, for example in the form of announcements of important macroeconomic variables. As all investors will be equally informed at the same time, the arrival of public information typically causes an immediate change in asset prices and volatility.
1 Private information refers to news that is distributed asymmetrically amongst market participants.
The presence of such private information may be revealed by the trading process and changes in the asset price itself, as informed investors may buy or sell the asset based on their privately held knowledge. Other investors observe the trading process and make inferences on this private information, giving rise to further price adjustments.
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The effect of public information on prices and volatility and the effect of private information on prices have been established for many financial markets. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2007), for example, document the link between public information releases and prices and volatility in foreign exchange, Treasury and equity markets. Based on high frequency intraday data they demonstrate that surprises in macro announcements (i.e. the difference between the actual release and the consensus market expectation) affect the conditional mean and volatility of exchange rates, treasuries and stocks. Recent literature also documents a relation between private information and prices for equity (see, e.g., Hasbrouck (1991) ), foreign exchange (see, e.g., Evans and Lyons (2008) ), and the Treasury market (see, e.g., Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) , Green (2004) and Pasquariello and Vega (2007) ).
The goal of this paper is to examine whether private information also influences the volatility of assets. We investigate this issue by considering both public and private information effects on both prices and volatility of the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond futures in one joint framework. Our results demonstrate that proxies for the level of private information, such as order flow and bid-ask spread, do indeed affect volatility. Specifically, a larger degree of information asymmetry increases the uncertainty surrounding Treasury futures prices. This positive relation between private information and volatility is significant in both statistical and economic terms. For example, a one standard deviation increase of order flow implies an increase of 65 basis points in daily volatility. We confirm the results on the prior literature on the effects of public and private information on prices and the effect of public information on volatility, and find that the effect of macroeconomic announcements on volatility is considerably smaller than the effect of private information. Among the 24
announcements that are included in the analysis, Nonfarm Payroll Employment is found to have the strongest impact on volatility. A one standard deviation surprise in an announcement of this variable increases daily volatility by only 12 basis points, which is more than five smaller than the effect of a comparable shock in order flow. The evident implication of our findings is that the level of private information should not be ignored when modeling and forecasting volatility. The idea of private information in the Treasury market needs some further clarification.
The conventional interpretation of private information, as typically applied to individual stocks, is advance knowledge of firm-related news, concerning earnings announcements, new investment projects, or changes in management, among others. Obviously, this interpre-tation does not apply to treasuries. Green (2004) provides several alternatives for the interpretation of private information in the Treasury market, such as information about endowments or the interpretation of macroeconomic news due to differential information processing skills. Despite the different interpretation, we can use similar variables to proxy private information in the Treasury market as commonly used for equities. We consider two such variables in our empirical analysis. First, we use order flow or net buying pressure (defined as the difference between the volume in buyer-initiated transactions and the volume in seller-initiated transactions) as a measure that could reveal heterogeneous information to the market. Second, we use the bid-ask spread. This latter proxy is more noisy than the former as it may include other liquidity determinants beyond private information (such as trader inventory effects).
Apart from uncovering the effect of private information on volatility as such, our study also contributes to the analysis of information effects on asset returns and volatility. We propose a modeling framework that allows us to simultaneously estimate the effects of public and private information on return and volatility. Specifically, we build upon the specification use a markov switching framework to identify the probability of private information flow, also from the return equation, and find that volatility is high when this probability is high controlling for other liquidity (shock) variables. Second, our work relates to Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) , who provide a multivariate analysis of returns, volatility, liquidity and order flow. One of their main findings is that volatility shocks are informative for predicting shifts in liquidity, highlighting the interrelation between the two. We focus on the reverse relationship and extend their work by investigating specifically the role of private information on volatility. We take order flow as the private information measure to be able to rely on economic theory that predicts causality from order flow to prices (as in Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ). Alternatively, one could look at the relation between volume and volatility as in Andersen (1996) . Finally, our analysis of private information effects on volatility relates to the study of the effect of buying-and sellingpressure in options markets (see, e.g., Bollen and Whaley (2004) and Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2009)). To take out price differences due to option contract specification (such as strike and maturity) the focus in this literature is typically on volatility rather than option prices directly.
We provide two extensions to analyze the robustness of our main result that private information affects volatility. First, we find that the effect of private information depends on the state of the economy, in the sense that the effect of order flow and the bid-ask spread on volatility is higher during contractions. Second, the effect of private information on volatility depends on the heterogeneity of analysts' expectations concerning upcoming public information releases. Order flow is found to influence volatility to a greater extent in times characterized by a high level of dispersion of beliefs. We contribute to the literature by using the ADS index, see Aruoba, Diebold and Scotti (2009).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and presents summary statistics. Section 3 describes methodological aspects of the research and provides corresponding empirical results. Section 4 reports extensions of the main analysis, allowing for the effects of public and private information to depend on the level of disagreement among analysts concerning upcoming public information releases or on the state of the economy. Section 5 concludes.
Data and summary statistics
We use two data sources to study the public and private information sources of volatility.
In the following three subsections we discuss the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond futures data, the public information variables as constructed from expectations and announcements of macroeconomic fundamentals, and the variables that we use as proxies for the presence of private information in the market. In the final subsection, we provide a preliminary idea about the effects of public and private information on the Treasury futures returns and volatility, focusing on the announcements of Nonfarm Payroll Employment.
U.S. Treasury bond futures data
We employ a high frequency data set of intraday transaction prices and volumes of 30 year the next three consecutive contracts can be traded. 3 We construct a single time series of transaction prices and volumes using the most nearby contract, which is the most intensely traded and is a close substitute for the underlying spot instrument. We roll over to the next contract when its daily tick volume exceeds the daily tick volume of the most nearby contract. This generally occurs between five to three days before expiration of the nearestto-maturity contract. Our data set records for each transaction the timestamp (in seconds), price and volume. 4 We aggregate the data to 5-minute intervals. 5 For computing returns we use the last observed transaction price in each intraday interval.
Public information variables
An advantage of studying the Treasury market is that public information affecting the prices and volatility is readily identified: these are the scheduled releases of macroeconomic variables. We use data on expectations and announcements of 24 U.S. macro variables. This data is obtained from Econoday, 6 and feeds the information that is published on Bloomberg.
The data on the actual released values comes from Haver Analytics. We derive our proxy for the market expectation from analysts' forecasts, which stem from Market News International and Thomson Financial. In order to obtain the analysts' forecasts the aforementioned companies hold a survey amongst a number of analysts for the announcements that are to come in the following week. The data set records the median of these forecasts, which provides an estimate of the market consensus. In addition, we have the lowest and highest analysts' forecasts for each announcement from June 2007 onwards.
We follow the existing literature (see, e.g., Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001)) by considering the surprise in each announcement. This surprise is constructed as the difference between the actual released value and the consensus analysts' forecast. Since units of measurement vary widely across macroeconomic variables, we standardize the surprises by dividing by their sample standard deviation. Hence the surprise S kt of announcement type k at time t is
where A kt denotes the announced value, M kt is the median of analyst forecasts and σ k is the sample standard deviation of their difference.
[insert Table 1 ] 
Private information variables
It is generally not possible to directly measure private information. In our study we use two We follow Pasquariello and Vega (2007) by using the unanticipated portion of aggregate order flow, as many microstructure imperfections can cause lagged effects in the observed order flow, see Hasbrouck (2004a) . Taking N t as the number of trades in interval t and v t,j as the volume of the j-th trade in this interval, we first calculate our measure of order flow, and is assumed to be initiated by the buying (selling) party.
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Our second measure for private information is the bid-ask spread during a certain interval. This proxy may be slightly more noisy, as it could also include inventory costs and order processing costs beyond effects due to asymmetric (private) information. 9 A high bid-ask spread may imply a low level of liquidity, which could be due to a high level of information asymmetry. As our data set only comprises transaction prices, we need to estimate the bid-ask spread. We do so by taking the difference between the (volume-weighted) buy price and the average sell price during a particular interval, see also Manaster and Mann (1996).
We remove spread estimates that are negative and trim observations that exceed the 99.5th
percentile of the empirical distribution to avoid having noisily measured spreads dominating our results. After the announcement, it does not revert to its pre-announcement level. Unanticipated order flow also increases during the first minutes following the announcement and remains at a higher level for some time after the announcement. Second, the figure confirms existing patterns found in the literature. Panel A shows an instantaneous price change after the announcement, which is consistent with for example Green (2004) . In addition, the bid-ask spread widens before the release. This finding combined with the volatility spike following the announcement is in line with Fleming and Remolona (1999) , who argue that the high spread is a result of controlling inventory risk at the time of extreme price volatility.
Public and private information effects: A first impression
[insert Figure 2 ]
We provide further insight into our data by considering patterns in the volatility, bid-ask spread and order flow during all (72) days with scheduled nonfarm payroll announcements during our sample period. For this purpose, we compute the average of these variables across these announcement days (where we use the absolute value of order flow) as well as corresponding averages across 72 randomly selected trading days without any macro announcement. Figure 2 depicts the average volatility, spread and order flow during these announcement and non-announcement days. Again, we see that volatility spikes around the time of the announcement, while it remains at a higher level also during the hour after the announcement. Similar patterns are seen for (absolute) order flow, which again encourages the research question of this paper whether private information affects volatility. Finally, the bid-ask spread peaks around the announcement time (8:30) , showing the earlier discussed relationship found by Fleming and Remolona (1999) during announcement days. After the announcement the spread reverts to its normal level faster than volatility and order flow.
Modeling the response of Treasury futures to public and private information
This section describes the econometric methodology and discusses the models that we adopt to examine the effects of public and private information on the returns and volatility of the 30 year Treasury bond futures. We develop our general modeling framework in different stages.
First, we consider the model equation that specifies the effects on 5-minute intraday returns.
Second, we augment this with a second model equation for the effects on (conditional) volatility.
Public and private information matter for returns
We adopt the framework of ABDV (2003) for examining the effect of public and private information on the 30 year Treasury bond futures prices. We assume a linear model specification for the 5-minute futures returns, including I autoregressive terms, and J lags of the announcement surprises of each of the K fundamentals. In addition, we include L lags of K ′ private information variables, such that the model reads
for t = 1, . . . , T where R t is the 5-minute return from time t − 1 to time t, S k,t is the standardized surprise of announcement k at time t as defined in (1) and P k ′ t denotes the private information variable, which is unanticipated order flow.
10 Finally, D a is a dummy variable that equals one on announcement days. The disturbance term ǫ t of the ABDV approach is likely to be heteroscedastic. We subsequently specify a model equation for the conditional volatility of ǫ t , which allows us to examine the effects of public and private information on the Treasury bond futures volatility explicitly. First, however, we document the effects on returns by estimating (2) only, accounting for the heteroskedasticity (and any remaining serial correlation not captured by the autoregressive terms) by using Newey-West standard errors.
[insert Table 2 ] Table 2 reports results based on estimating the model in (2) using the full sample period In line with earlier research (e.g., ABDV (2007), Table 5A ) we find that many of the fundamentals have a significant effect on bond (futures) returns. We explain the reaction of the bond market to macroeconomic news mainly in terms of revisions of inflationary expectations, which is in accordance with commentaries in the financial press. In line with the view of the Philips curve, inflation should be positively correlated with economic activity. A higher inflation raises the interest rate, hence the return decreases. The table shows (2004)). An increase in unanticipated order flow sug-gests an increase in (buyer initiated) trades possibly based on having private information, which implies higher prices and hence increased returns.
[insert Table 3] Considering the importance of macroeconomic announcements in terms of explanatory power for the 5-minute returns, the R 2 of the specification (2) is rather small at 0.019. This is somewhat misleading though, since these announcements occur relatively rarely, in the sense that the number of observations for which a surprise actually occurs is only a very small fraction of the total sample size. To highlight the importance of news during the announcement periods, we estimate the simplified model 
Public and private information also matter for volatility
We propose a model specification that estimates both the mean and volatility equation simul- (2)) is proposed that includes the standardized surprises, autoregressive terms and a flexible Fourier series capturing the intraday pattern of volatility.
The volatility equation reads:
where |ǫ t | is the absolute value of the residual of equation (2) i.e. it is similar to equation (2) . Defining the conditional variance h t as E[ǫ the information set at time t, the adapted model has the following specification:
where u t ∼ N(0, 1), τ t denotes the joint public and private news component, and g t represents the unit-GARCH term. Again, S k,t is the standardized surprise of announcement k at time t as defined in (1) and P k ′ t denotes the private information variable, which is unanticipated order flow and the bid-ask spread.
12 Finally, D a is a dummy variable that equals one on announcement days.
Apart from our adaptation of the Spline-GARCH model, two main differences with the ABDV approach arise. First, the exponential functional form guarantees that our 'public and private news component' is always positive. Second, the model is estimated in one step, hence the parameter uncertainty of the return equation is incorporated in the volatility equation. We estimate this model by maximum likelihood. As this can be a tough non-linear maximization problem, we perform first the 'ABDV approach', i.e. estimating equation (2) and (4) by OLS. We use the estimated coefficients as meaningful starting values for the maximization of the likelihood. 13 In addition, we reduce the computational burden by estimating the conditional likelihood: first we estimate the volatility parameters while holding the return parameters fixed and vice versa. In the last step we estimate the joint likelihood. Standard errors are obtained by using the Hessian function.
[insert Table 4] [insert Figure 3 ] Table 4 announcements affect volatility in the first five minutes after the announcement, whereas some variables also have a significant impact on volatility during the next five minutes. The 14 The Akaike and Schwarz criteria propose Q = 5 and J ′ = 0 in the 'ABDV approach', which is used for meaningful starting values. However, a bottom-up procedure, i.e. including a lag of each public news variable until the F-test of joint significance of all estimated coefficients can not be rejected, allows for one lag. To be sure that we do not miss any information of lagged public news surprises, we set J ′ equal to one in the 'ABDV approach'. impact of public information on volatility is less short-lived compared to the impact on returns, although a likelihood-ratio test indicates only one lag of the macro announcement variables is required. Figure 3 depicts the Fourier series that captures the intraday deviations from the daily volatility. Typically, when floor trading starts, volatility is relatively high, whereas during lunch and after closing time (15:00) volatility is relatively low. It is important to incorporate this intraday pattern by explaining intraday volatility since all coefficients are statistically different from zero.
[insert Table 5 ] Table 5 shows the economic significance of the estimated coefficients of the Spline-GARCH model. We take the three most influential news announcements on volatility, GDP Advance, Nonfarm Payroll Employment and the CPI, and compute the partial derivative of the volatility with respect to the announcements. In addition, we include Initial Unemployment Claims to the table. Recall that news announcements occur rarely, while order flow and the bid-ask spread are available at each 5-minute interval. We add up the influence of private variables on the volatility over a whole day to compare both public and private variables in an economic meaningful way. Specifically, we add up all values of the square root of τ t over all intraday intervals including both private and public variables and subtract the sum of the volatilities without including the public variables.
The most striking result is the daily impact of the private information proxies. Unanticipated order flow and the bid-ask spread increase on average the daily volatility by 65 basis points. This number is robust against special announcement releases, as we average it out over all 1,509 trading days. This is quite large compared to the effect of public information variables. Nonfarm Payroll Employment releases are the most influential news announcements: A one standard deviation change in the surprise implies on average an increase of 12 basis points of the volatility. The economic significance of the GDP advance and the CPI index is of the same order, whereas a release of the initial unemployment claims changes volatility by three basis points on average. Hence in comparison with public information, the effect of private information is striking.
In summary, the results clearly suggest that private information variables are statistically and economically significant explanatory variables for volatility. The higher the absolute value of order flow and the lower the market liquidity, the higher the revealed private information and in turn the uncertainty on the Treasury market. This finding strongly suggests that the level of private information should not be ignored by modeling market volatility.
Extensions
We analyze two extensions of the Spline-GARCH model of the previous section. First, we condition our results on the state of the economy. That is, we separate the data into expansion and recession periods. We contribute to the literature by using the ADS index.
Second, we consider the dispersion of beliefs among traders and examine the influence on both the returns and volatility.
Conditioning on the state of the economy
We investigate the effect of public information on returns and volatility conditional on the state of the economy. Compared to existing research on this issue (e.g., Beber and Brandt Underlying the index are economic indicators that mix high-and low-frequency information and stock and flow data. 15 The average value of the ADS index is zero. Relatively higher positive values indicate relatively better-than-average conditions, whereas relatively more negative values indicate relatively worse-than-average conditions. We convert the ADS index into an expansion and recession regime by introducing dummy variables. A positive value is associated with an expansion regime and vice versa. The adapted Spline-GARCH model 15 In particular, the (seasonally adjusted) economic indicators are: weekly initial jobless claims; monthly payroll employment, industrial production, personal income less transfer payments, manufacturing and trade sales; and quarterly real GDP.
reads:
where again u t ∼ N(0, 1), τ t denotes the public and private news component, and g t represents the unit-GARCH term. The dummy variables D E and D R equal one when the ADS index is positive (Expansion) and negative (Recession) respectively. We perform a Wald test to examine whether the estimated coefficients β E,kj ′ and β R,kj ′ statistically differ from each other.
[insert Table 6 ] Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients of the adapted Spline-GARCH model. Panel In summary, private information matters for volatility, irrespective of the state of the economy. The bid-ask spread has more impact during recessions. In addition, public information has a larger influence on volatility during expansions.
Order flow and information heterogeneity
We investigate the impact of order flow on both the return and volatility under different states of information heterogeneity. Pasquariello and Vega (2007) study the impact of order flow on the return conditional on the dispersion of beliefs. We extend this analysis by focusing also on the effect of order flow on volatility under different levels of information heterogeneity.
We measure the dispersion of beliefs using the range of analysts' forecasts for the 24 listed macro announcements. This is slightly different from Pasquariello and Vega (2007), who take the standard deviation of analysts forecasts (obtained from MMS) to estimate the dispersion. We follow the Pasquariello and Vega methodology to incorporate the dispersion of beliefs. We first convert the weekly and quarterly dispersions to a monthly frequency.
This conversion for the weekly announcement (Initial Unemployment Claims) is done by simply averaging the range across four weeks. For the three quarterly announcements in the sample, GDP Advance, Preliminary, and Final, we assume that the dispersion of beliefs in the first month of the quarter is constant throughout the quarter. The monthly proxy for information heterogeneity is defined as a sum of monthly (scaled) dispersions across announcements,
where RA kt is the highest minus the lowest professional forecast of announcement k at time t andμ(RA kt ) andσ(RA kt ) are its sample mean and standard deviation, respectively. We set P equal to 24, hence including all types of macroeconomic announcements. Given the monthly dispersion estimates, we interact order flow with dummy variables that differentiate months with low, medium and high information heterogeneity. It would also be consistent to interact the standardized surprises with these dummy variables. However, since the number of surprises is limited in our subsample, it would be hard to find reliable results.
[insert Table 7 ] Table 7 reports results containing the interaction with the degree of information asymmetry. We start our sample at June 2007 as the range of forecasts of analysts about the macro announcements used to construct the dispersion measure is only available since this date.
This implies that the subsample contains roughly 30 monthly macro announcements and 12 quarterly announcements. The estimates are roughly similar to the macro announcement coefficients reported earlier; therefore we do not provide the estimated coefficients corresponding to the public macro announcement variables. The informativeness of order flow is considerably higher for the months with highest dispersion in analyst forecasts, both in the return and volatility equation. We find a monotonic increase in the coefficients, indicating that the higher the dispersion, the more informative is order flow for return and volatility.
This result confirms that of Paquariello and Vega (2007), but also provides new insight in explaining the conditional volatility. Order flow has a considerably stronger impact on uncertainty in times of high dispersion of beliefs among traders. Hence in times of increased uncertainty about macro fundamentals, order flow becomes more important and has an stronger effect on the uncertainty of Treasury futures.
To shed light on the economic significance, the partial effect of one standard deviation shock in order flow in months with high dispersion on the conditional volatility is equal to 3.35 basis points in a 5-minute interval. 17 As a comparison, the corresponding values in times of low and medium dispersion are equal to 0.85 and 1.18 respectively. Hence order flow is almost four times more important when there is high information heterogeneity compared to low dispersion of beliefs among investors. The results are also robust as different values of P in SRA P t hardly change the results.
Conclusion
We study the impact of public and private information on volatility in financial markets. We Our main finding is that private information variables, such as order flow and the bidask spread, significantly affect volatility. Moreover, when we differentiate between different regimes of information heterogeneity, the impact of order flow on the volatility is almost four times larger when there is high dispersion of beliefs among investors compared to a low dispersion regime. Finally, we condition the effect of private and public information on the state of the economy, by using the ADS index. We find that the effect of private information depends on the state of the economy, in the sense that the effect of order flow and the bid-ask spread on volatility is higher during contractions. Our results imply that risk managers, traders, portfolio managers and regulators should take into account private information variables as a determinant of volatility. 17 We compute this by taking the partial effect of each public/private variable on the conditional volatility. 
where R t is the 5-minute log return of 30 year U.S. Treasury bond futures from time period t − 1 to t, S k,t is the standardized surprise of announcement type k, k = 1, . . . , 24 and OF * t denotes the unanticipated order flow. We include a dummy variable that equals one on announcement days. The first column presents results of the regression where only public information is included. The second column provide results of the regression that contains both public and private information. The superscripts * * * , * * and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, where the significance is assessed using Newey-West standard errors. The sample goes from January 2, 2004 
where R t is the 5-minute log return of the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond futures from period t − 1 to t. We include only the pairs (R t , S k,t ) when an announcement of fundamental k was made at time t. The superscripts * * * , * * and * donate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The sample goes from 
where R t is the 5-minute log return of the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond futures from time period t − 1 to t, S k,t is the standardized news announcement for k = 1, . . . , 24 and P t and OF * t denote the bid-ask spread and the unanticipated order flow from period t to t + 1. Further, I = 3, J = 0, J ′ = 1 and Q = 5. In Panel A we report parameter estimates corresponding with private news for four various specifications, whereas panel B provides the public news coefficients of the last specification. The superscripts * * * , * * , and * donate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample goes from 
where R t is the 5-minute log return of the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond futures from time period t − 1 to t, S kt is the standardized news announcement for k = 1, . . . , 24 and P t and OF * t denote the bid-ask spread and the unanticipated order flow from period t to t + 1. Further, I = 3, J = 0, J ′ = 1 and Q = 5. In case of the public information variables, the economic significance is equal to the partial derivative of the conditional volatility ( √ h t ) with respect to the variable S kt . We measure the economic impact of the private information variables on volatility by first adding up all contributions of these variables to the conditional volatilities over all intraday intervals on each day. In addition we take the mean over all sample days. We round all values to integers. The sample goes from January 2, 2004 
where R t is the 5-minute log return of the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond futures from time period t−1 to t, S k,t is the standardized news announcement for k = 1, . . . , 24, OF * t denotes the unanticipated order flow and P t the bid-ask spread from period t to t + 1. The dummy variables D E and D R denotes the expansion and he recession regimes, which are constructed with use of the ADS-index. Further, I = 3, J = 0, J ′ = 1 and Q = 5. Panel A contain estimated coefficients regarding the return part of the model. We use the Wald-test to test on statistical difference of the coefficients during expansions and recessions. Panel B contains the volatility part. We show only the contemporaneous effect and discard the coefficients corresponding with the first lag. The superscripts * * * , * * and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The sample goes from where R t is the 5-minute log return of the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond futures from time period t − 1 to t, S k,t is the standardized news announcement for k = 1, . . . , 24, OF * t denotes the unanticipated order flow and P t the bid-ask spread from period t to t + 1. We introduce three dummy variables, D l , D m , and D h which represent a low, medium or high level of information heterogeneity. Results below are for I = 3, I ′ = 12, J = 0, J ′ = 1 and Q = 5. Since the focus is on the interaction between order flow and the dummy variables, we only report the coefficients corresponding with private information. The superscripts * * * , * * , and * donate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample goes from June This figure depicts the intraday effects that capture the high-frequency pattern of deviations of intraday volatility from its daily average, as estimated in the Spline-GARCH model defined in (5) . In addition, the figure depicts 95% confidence bounds. Time
